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It is widely held that every person is a person essentially, where being a person is
having special mental properties such as intelligence and self-consciousness. It
follows that nothing can acquire or lose these properties. The paper argues that
this rules out all familiar psychological-continuity views of personal identity over
time. It also faces grave difficulties in accounting for the mental powers of human
beings who are not intelligent and self-conscious, such as foetuses and those with
dementia.
1. Person essentialism
‘Person essentialism’ is the claim that every person is a person essen-
tially. It comes in a weaker and a stronger form. The weaker says that
nothing can be a person at one time and a nonperson at another: no
person can cease to be a person without ceasing to exist, and no
nonperson can become a person. The stronger says that nothing can
be a person in one circumstance and a nonperson in another: no
person could have been a nonperson and no nonperson could have
been a person. We can state them like this:
Weak: Necessarily, if something is a person at a time, then there is
no time when it exists but is not a person.
Strong: Necessarily, if something is a person at a time, then ne-
cessarily there is no time when it exists but is not a person.
The stronger form entails the weaker but not vice versa. If person-
hood is a property you could not lack, then you cannot gain or lose it.
But it might be a property you cannot gain or lose even though you
could either have or lack it throughout your life, like being at some
time a lumberjack. The two claims are nearly always held together.
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Their import depends on what it is to be a person. Most philoso-
phers say that it is to have certain special mental powers: a person is
something that is intelligent and self-conscious in a certain way, where
self-consciousness is the ability to think about oneself in the first
person. You have that ability even when you are asleep and not
exercising it. But human embryos don’t have it. They have only the
capacity to develop it. The tradition derives from Locke, who fam-
ously defined ‘person’ as ‘a thinking intelligent being, that has reason
and reflection, and can consider itself as itself’ (Locke 1975, p. 335).
Our interest is in the combination of person essentialism with
Lockean personhood. It says that nothing could have the mental
powers that make something a person only temporarily or contin-
gently, so that whatever is a person in the Lockean sense is so essen-
tially. Call this Lockean person essentialism.
2. Person essentialism in current debate
Lockean person essentialism pervades contemporary discussions of
personal identity. Many endorse it explicitly.1 More often, though, it
is tacitly presupposed by the terms of the debate. Nearly all proposed
definitions of personhood, for example, have the form:
x is a person ¼df :::;
a typical completion being something like ‘x is intelligent and self-con-
scious’. Taken at face value, this implies that whatever is a person is a
person simpliciter, without temporal qualification. But your being a person
simpliciter rules out your being a nonperson at another time: if you had
once been a nonperson, your being a person must amount to your being a
person now. So your being a person without temporal qualification would
entail the weaker form of person essentialism. To leave open the possibility
that a thing might become or cease to be a person, we should have to say
instead what it is to be a person at a time, completing the formula:
x is a person at time t ¼df ::::
Yet almost no one defines personhood in this way. Person essen-
tialism makes the two formulations equivalent: if nothing can be a
person only temporarily, the temporal qualification adds nothing.
1 For example, Baker (2000, p. 11), Buchanan and Brock (1990, pp. 159f.), Lowe (2012,
p. 146), Rosenberg (1998, p. 49), Sharpe (2015, p. 65), and Shoemaker (2011, p. 360).
Nozick’s view (1981, pp. 78f.) is similar, and has some of the same troubling consequences.
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It may be that authors omit the temporal qualification only to
simplify their formulations, without meaning to assume person es-
sentialism. They define ‘person’ as a ‘being that is intelligent and self-
conscious’ in the way that we might define ‘lumberjack’ as ‘someone
whose job is cutting down trees’. No one would take this to imply that
lumberjacks must be lumberjacks without temporal qualification, or
to rule out the possibility that someone might, by changing her em-
ployment, become or cease to be one. We omit the qualification be-
cause everyone knows this, and would add it in a context where
precision was important. And it may be the same with definitions
of personhood.
Be that as it may, another well-known problem, that of personal
identity over time, is almost invariably stated in a way that clearly
presupposes person essentialism. Here is a representative statement
from a highly regarded introduction:
The problem of personal identity over time is the problem of giving an
account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person
identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at
another. (Noonan 2003, p. 2)
Derek Parfit begins his discussion of the problem by asking ‘What
makes a person at two different times one and the same person?’
(1984, p. 202; see also 2012, pp. 6f.). Locke himself took the question
to be ‘what makes the same person’ (1975, p. 336). Galen Strawson calls
a similar formulation ‘the canonical personal identity question’ (2011,
p. 77), and it is enshrined in nearly all philosophical reference works.2
The ‘canonical question’ takes cases where a person exists at one
time and a person exists at another, and asks what is necessary and
sufficient for them to be one person rather than two. Unless we pre-
suppose person essentialism, however, this question will not ask what
sort of thing you could survive, but only what you could survive and
remain a person (Mackie 1999, pp. 224-7). It will not ask what it takes
for something that is not a person at another time—a corpse, say, or
an embryo—to be you. It will ask under what circumstances you
could exist at another time and be a person, but not under what
circumstances you could exist at another time without being a person.
2 For example, Blackburn (2005), Bunnin (2004, p. 512), Flew and Priest (2002, p. 302),
Garrett (1998; 2005, p. 459), Penelhum (1967, p. 95), D. Shoemaker (2019), S. Shoemaker
(2015), Snowdon (2005), and P. F. Strawson (1995).
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But this is not how friends of the canonical question understand it.
Here is a typical answer:
Necessarily, if a person x exists at one time and a person y exists at
another, x is y if and only if x is in some way psychologically
continuous, at the first time, with y as it is at the other time.
(Set aside complications to do with branching.) Those giving answers
like this do not intend to say only what it takes for someone to survive
and remain a person. They mean that psychological continuity is ne-
cessary for us to continue existing at all. If you lose all psychological
continuity, that’s the end of you: you don’t just cease to be a person. Yet
if person essentialism were false, the answer would be compatible with
your one day being a corpse, even though no corpse could be psycho-
logically continuous with you. Because a corpse is not a person (in the
Lockean sense), the answer would say nothing about how you could
relate to one. It would be equally consistent with your having been a
microscopic embryo, again without psychological continuity. It would
tell us nothing about what would happen to you if you ceased to be a
person, or what you might have done before becoming one. For all it
would say, you could survive complete psychological discontinuity, as
long as this happened at a time when you were not a person (Olson
1997, p. 26). Without the assumption of person essentialism, answers to
the canonical question would be completely silent about such cases.
None of those posing the question or giving anything like the typical
answer would accept this. They ask what it takes for a past or future
person to be you because they assume that only a person could be you:
you could not exist at a time without being a person then.
To ask about our persistence conditions without presupposing per-
son essentialism, we must replace the canonical question with this
neutral one:
If something is a person at one time and something exists at an-
other time (whether or not it is a person then), what is necessary
and sufficient for them to be one and the same?
Person essentialism makes the two questions equivalent: if you could
not possibly exist without being a person, there is no difference be-
tween what you could survive while remaining a person and what you
could survive simpliciter. The only reason to prefer the canonical
question over the neutral one is the presumption of person essential-
ism. Yet very few philosophers ask the neutral question, showing how
widespread this presumption is.
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So person essentialism is widely held. And so is the Lockean con-
ception of personhood. The same overview we quoted earlier states
that ‘when philosophers speak of the problem of personal identity
they do not use “person” as a mere synonym of “human being”.
Rather they use it in the sense introduced by Locke’.3 Person essenti-
alists are almost always Lockean person essentialists.
There are, of course, non-Lockean accounts on which intelligence
and self-consciousness are either unnecessary for personhood
(Wiggins 1980, p. 171; Oderberg 2005, p. 81; Schechtman 2014,
pp. 119-25) or insufficient (Lewis 1976, p. 22; Noonan 1998, p. 316).
We have no objection to them or to their combination with person
essentialism. They are not our concern. Henceforward we will use
‘person’ to mean ‘person in the Lockean sense’.
While it’s clear that Lockean person essentialism is the dominant
view, the reasons for its dominance are less evident. There is nothing
obvious about it. It’s a tautology that whatever is a person is a person,
but not that whatever is a person must be a person if it exists at all.
Nothing in the Lockean account of personhood rules out someone’s
losing the mental powers that make her a person and continuing to
exist as a nonperson, just as a lumberjack might give up felling trees
and take up dressmaking instead. And arguments for the view are
scarce. What makes it so magnetic?
It may seem to follow from the widely held view that our persistence
consists in a sort of psychological continuity: that a past or future being
is you just if she is in some way psychologically continuous, then, with
you as you are now (in the absence of branching, perhaps). That would
rule out your existing without any mental properties at all—as an em-
bryo or a corpse, say—as you cannot be psychologically continuous
with such a being. But as it would not rule out your existing with
mental properties falling short of personhood, it does not entail person
essentialism. We will show in a moment that psychological-continuity
views are actually inconsistent with person essentialism.
A better proposal starts by asking what we are ‘most fundamentally’.
Whatever exactly this amounts to, the answer would presumably have
to be a kind we belong to essentially: no kind that a thing belonged to
only contingently would count as fundamental in the relevant sense.
3 Noonan (2003, p. 8). See also Glover (1988, p. 14), Parfit (1984, p. 202; 2012, p. 6),
McMahan (2002, p. 46), G. Strawson (2009, pp. 59f.), and Sharpe (2015, p. 56), in addition to
those cited in footnote 1.
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And one natural answer is that our fundamental kind (or one of them,
if we could have several) is rational being: a thing with certain cognitive
powers, including the ability to think about itself in the first person—in
other words, person in the Lockean sense.
But our fundamental kind might be rational being in a weaker sense
than actually having these powers: in the sense of having the capacity
to acquire them, perhaps. Nor is rational being the only plausible
candidate for our fundamental kind. Why not human being—a thing
with a certain biological nature? Members of this kind are not neces-
sarily rational, even if that is their normal condition. Neither of these
alternatives would support person essentialism.
We suspect that Lockean person essentialism is nothing more than
an ancient and unquestioned dogma.
3. The psychological-continuity problem
Whatever its appeal, the view faces serious objections. First, it is in-
consistent with the view that our persistence consists in a sort of
psychological continuity. This is especially surprising as the two views
are almost always held together. And both are, of course, associated
with Locke. Yet the claim that we are essentially people in the Lockean
sense rules out all proposed views of this sort.
Psychological continuity is usually defined in terms of causal de-
pendence (Shoemaker 1984, pp. 89f.). A mental state or event can be
causally dependent on an earlier one: the memory of a past experi-
ence, for example, will be causally dependent on the experience, and
your current ambivalence towards lumberjacks is causally dependent
on the attitude to the same effect that you had last month. Then we
can say that a thing x is psychologically continuous, at a time t, with a
thing y as it is at an earlier time t* just if the mental states x is in at t
are causally dependent in the right way on the mental states y is in at
t*, or when they are connected by a chain of such causal dependencies.
(The qualification ‘in the right way’ is meant to rule out causal de-
pendence of a sort that has nothing to do with a person’s persistence.
Many of your current beliefs are causally dependent on beliefs your
mother had when you were a child: you have them now because of
what she believed then and accordingly taught you. But that is no
reason to suppose that you are your mother: it’s the wrong sort of
causal dependence.)
Now consider those with severe (‘stage-3’) Alzheimer’s dementia.
They are deprived of intelligence and self-consciousness to a drastic
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extent (Reisberg et al. 1982, Reas 2017, WHO 2019). As bioethicists
generally acknowledge, this makes them nonpeople in the Lockean
sense (for example, Kuhse (1999, p. 356), DeGrazia (2005, pp. 6,
164), and Schechtman (2010, p. 276)). If no person can become a
nonperson, then no person could survive in this condition: to get
severe dementia is not just to cease to be a person, but to stop existing
altogether. The resulting being, though alive and conscious, must be a
numerically different entity (DeGrazia 2005, p. 167).
But even if severe dementia destroys most of your mental powers,
including self-consciousness, the devastation is not complete. The
resulting being will still be in mental states causally dependent on
those you were in shortly before the loss. He or she will inherit
some of your memories, preferences, and tastes. And this causal de-
pendence will be secured by the continued functioning of your ner-
vous system—the right way by anyone’s lights. This will make her
psychologically continuous with you as you were when you were still a
person (DeGrazia 2005, p. 168). It follows from almost any
psychological-continuity view of personal identity that she will be
you, despite not then being a person—contrary to Lockean person
essentialism in both its strong and weak forms.
The same goes for the beginning of life. You grew from a certain
foetus. At some point during her prenatal development, that foetus
acquired her first mental powers. But she did not become intelligent
and self-conscious straight away. She was merely conscious first.
Because she was not then a person, person essentialism rules out
her being you. Yet you were psychologically continuous, when you
were first a person, with the foetus (or infant) as she was just previ-
ously: again, you inherited some of her memories, preferences, and
other mental states. Almost any psychological-continuity view will
imply that the foetus (or infant) is you.
Call this the psychological-continuity problem. It would no doubt be
possible to devise a psychological-continuity view that avoids it by
ruling out our being the conscious nonpeople we grew from or that
would result from our developing severe dementia. Our persistence
might consist in a sort of psychological continuity that holds through-
out the time when we are people, but not between a person and the
conscious foetus she grew from or the mentally impaired nursing-
home resident that would result from her lapsing into stage-3 demen-
tia. For example, we might say that a being existing at another time is
you just if it is intelligent and self-conscious then and its having these
properties in particular is causally dependent in the right way on your
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having them now or vice versa. Or we might say that our persistence
consists only in the continuity of those mental properties that require
self-consciousness. Continuity of mental properties not required for
personhood—the sort we find in foetuses, dementia sufferers, and
dogs—would be irrelevant to our persistence.
That would be compatible with Lockean person essentialism. But
only a tough-minded metaphysician could seriously believe it.
Imagine that your friend Sally gets severe senile dementia. At the
institution where she is confined, you encounter a doddery resident
of familiar appearance. You may well say ‘That’s not the Sally I knew’.
But then you might say the same if she were definitely still a person
but dramatically altered—following a stroke, say, or heavily sedated.
These are not judgments about numerical identity. You might just as
easily say ‘She’s not the person she used to be’, which presupposes that
she existed both before and after getting dementia. The current pro-
posal implies that the nursing home resident is a being you have never
seen before, and that your friend now has the same status she would
have if she had died and been cremated.
In any event, we are not aware of any actual proposal of this sort.
Some attribute such a view to Parfit—specifically, that our persistence
consists in a degree of psychological continuity that holds only while
we are people (McMahan 2002, p. 45). This is a mistake. Parfit did
once say (1984, p. 206) that you persist just if you have at least half as
many direct psychological connections—a memory caused by an ear-
lier experience, for instance—over a day as there actually are during a
day in the life of nearly every person (and there is no branching). But
if there are enough such connections during your first day as a person,
there will almost certainly be enough during the 24-hour period be-
ginning ten seconds earlier. It would be an extraordinary coincidence
if the required number of connections first appeared in even one
person at precisely the moment she became a person in the
Lockean sense. The two events are completely independent: the def-
inition of personhood implies nothing about numbers of direct psy-
chological connections. To say that they must always occur together
would be like saying that all people necessarily acquire the physio-
logical capacity to reproduce at precisely the moment they reach the
legal age of sexual consent.
This reveals a fundamental incoherence in orthodox thinking about
personal identity (including Parfit’s influential account). The domin-
ant view for the past century has been that some sort of psychological
continuity is both necessary and sufficient for us to persist. (Debates
8 Against Person Essentialism
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about our persistence are very often about which sort it is.) And as we
have seen, most of this discussion presupposes Lockean person essen-
tialism. Yet the two views are incompatible. We are all psychologically
continuous—in the right way and with no branching—with beings as
they are at times when they are not people in the Lockean sense. It
follows that either we were once nonpeople, contrary to person es-
sentialism, or such psychological continuity is insufficient for us to
persist, contrary to psychological-continuity views.
4. The thinking-animal problem
A different problem for Lockean person essentialism has to do with
the mental powers of human beings that do not count as people in the
Lockean sense. One version of it applies to human organisms, another
to foetuses and those with dementia. Start with organisms.
Person essentialism implies that no human organism is ever a per-
son. That’s because no human organism is a person essentially. Human
organisms are not intelligent and self-conscious throughout their ex-
istence. They do not come into the world as Lockean people, but as
embryos entirely devoid of mental powers. And even if one did some-
how come into being as a mature adult—if a capricious deity were to
create a duplicate of you ex nihilo, say—it would still be possible for it to
exist without being a person, in a state of severe dementia or the like. So
if whatever is a person must be a person throughout its existence, no
human organism could ever be a person. Given that to be a person is to
be intelligent and self-conscious, that makes it absolutely impossible for
a human organism to have these mental properties. And if no human
organism could be intelligent and self-conscious, it’s hard to see how
any other biological organism could be.
This is surprising. Why should it be impossible for an organism to
have these properties? You are intelligent and self-conscious. The or-
ganism you see in the mirror has the same brain that you have, the
same surroundings, the same education, and the same behaviour in
both actual and counterfactual situations. What could prevent it from
using that brain to think in the way that you do?
This is a version of the so-called ‘thinking-animal problem’ brought
against psychological-continuity views of personal identity over time
(Snowdon 1990, pp. 89f.; Olson 1997, pp. 102-8). Those views say that
necessarily all people persist by virtue of psychological continuity.
Because no organism, human or otherwise, persists by virtue of psy-
chological continuity (van Inwagen 1990, pp. 182-8; Olson 2015, pp.
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102-5) it follows that none could be a person. Given a Lockean ac-
count of personhood, this rules out any organism’s being intelligent
and self-conscious—again leaving us wondering why.
Three answers to this question have been proposed.4 All three say
that organisms cannot have the mental powers sufficient for person-
hood because they cannot have mental properties at all. Psychology
and biology–mind and life–are metaphysically incompatible.
The first says that organisms cannot have mental properties because
they are material things. Thinking or conscious beings, ourselves included,
must be immaterial (Foster 1991, pp. 206-12; Hasker 2010, pp. 181-3).
The second says that organisms cannot have mental properties be-
cause of their parts. It’s not organisms that think, but rather their
brains or central nervous systems. An organism thinks only in the
sense of having a thinking part, much as a car is powerful by having a
powerful engine. Having hands and feet as parts makes it impossible
for a thing to have mental properties in anything but this loose and
superficial sense (Hudson 2007, pp. 218f.; Parfit 2012, p. 17).
The third answer is that organisms cannot have mental properties
because of their persistence conditions. It belongs to the nature of
mental properties that nothing can have them unless psychological
continuity is sufficient for it to persist. But psychological continuity is
not sufficient for an organism to persist. If your brain were trans-
planted into another head, the recipient may end up psychologically
continuous with you. Yet this would not move an organism to an-
other head: it would only move an organ from one organism to an-
other, just as a liver transplant does. Two organisms can be
psychologically continuous. The claim is that precisely this fact pre-
vents them from having mental properties (Shoemaker 2011).
5. The conscious-foetus problem
If one of these three proposals were right, the implication of Lockean
person essentialism that no organism could be intelligent and self-
conscious would not be especially troubling: we should know already
on other grounds that no organism could have any mental property.
But a further difficulty arises in the case of human beings whose
mental properties fall short of personhood.
4 Or maybe four: see our discussion of Baker in §6.
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Suppose you one day lose your power of self-consciousness owing
to senile dementia and, being a person essentially, thereby cease to
exist. Call the being this leaves behind D. D presumably exists today,
while you are healthy: your later demise could hardly bring her into
existence. But according to person essentialism D is never a person, as
she is not one essentially. Not being a person, she is never intelligent
and self-conscious—not merely when suffering from dementia, but
even now, in her prime. Why not? Again, you are intelligent and self-
conscious, and D now has the same brain that you have, the same
surroundings, the same education, and the same behaviour. What
could prevent her from using that brain to think as you do?
The proposed solutions to the thinking-animal problem are no help
here. They purport to explain why organisms cannot have the mental
properties required for personhood by denying that organisms can
have mental properties at all (because they’re material things or have
the wrong parts or persistence conditions). But D has got mental
properties. She can think to an extent, and is at least minimally con-
scious during her waking hours. She can suffer: that’s why those with
dementia deserve humane treatment. Lockean person essentialism
implies that beings with mental properties falling short of personhood
in senile dementia cannot be intelligent and self-conscious when
healthy, despite then being physically and behaviourally identical to
normal adult people. There must be some explanation for this re-
markable fact. But it cannot be the metaphysical incompatibility of
mind and life.
Our beginnings create a similar puzzle. The foetus you grew from—
call her F—was once conscious but not self-conscious. At that point
she was not a person. Yet she would seem to exist now: the emergence
of intelligence and self-consciousness in the normal course of her
development could hardly have destroyed her. It follows from
Lockean person essentialism that she never became a person, as it is
metaphysically impossible for anything that is not self-conscious at
some time to acquire the mental properties sufficient for personhood,
even when healthy and mature. F can never become self-conscious.
But why not? She now has the same brain that you have, and the same
surroundings, education, and behaviour. What prevents her from
using that brain to think as you do? Once more, the answer cannot
be that she can have no mental properties at all. She has got them—or
at least she did when she was a foetus.5
How the two problems are related—the one about dementia and
the one about foetuses—depends on the relation between D and F. It
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may be that the conscious nonperson that would result from your
getting stage-3 dementia is the very conscious foetus you grew from,
combining the two problems into one. Otherwise there will be two
conscious nonpeople and thus two problems. We will assume for the
sake of simplicity that D is F.
We can summarize the unified problem like this: the foetus that
gave rise to you, and which might one day get severe dementia, has
mental properties for a time, but not those sufficient for personhood.
It is not then a person. Yet it would appear to exist now, with a
mature and healthy brain. And because it is capable of having mental
properties, we should expect it to have the same mental powers now
that you have, making it now a person. In that case a nonperson could
become, and later cease to be, a person, contrary to person essential-
ism. Call this the conscious-foetus problem.
6. Solutions
The problem arises from two claims. First, something can be a foetus
(and not a person) at one time and a healthy adult at another. It is
possible, in other words, for a human foetus to survive birth and
childhood in normal conditions. The other is that a being that was
once a conscious foetus can have the mental properties sufficient for
personhood in its adult state. (We omit the analogous claims to do
with dementia sufferers.) Together they entail that something can be a
person only temporarily. Person essentialists must reject one of them.
To reject the first is to deny that a foetus can become a healthy
adult. The foetus you grew from no longer exists. Despite appearan-
ces, it perished the moment it was about to become intelligent and
self-conscious, and was instantly replaced by a person—you—who
did not exist before. It is metaphysically impossible for any conscious
being to survive the developmental stage that creates the properties
sufficient for personhood. Nor can any being survive the sort of cog-
nitive decline that destroys these properties, even if its other mental
powers remain intact and there is a good degree of psychological
continuity. It must cease to exist and be replaced by a new conscious
being that did not exist before. The normal development of intelli-
gence and self-consciousness is necessarily fatal, and senile dementia
generates a new conscious being.
5 David Hershenov (2006, pp. 233f.) gives a brief and insightful discussion of these prob-
lems, but does not connect them with person essentialism.
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We might call this a ‘metaphysical’ solution to the conscious-foetus
problem, as it has to do with existence and identity over time. It says
that a foetal nonperson cannot be a person in its prime because it
cannot even exist in its prime. It can survive birth and childhood only
if, owing to some severe neural defect, it never develops intelligence
and self-consciousness. We normally call such events ‘tragic’ because
we take them to deprive a being of the sort of mental life the rest of us
enjoy. But on this proposal they could not deprive any being of any-
thing: not even a perfectly healthy foetus could ever go on to acquire
intelligence and self-consciousness.
Views of this sort have occasionally been proposed (Burke 1994;
McMahan 2002, pp. 46f.; Sharpe 2015, pp. 66f.), but they are hard to
take seriously. They go against nearly everything we thought we knew
about the persistence of animate beings, and their accounts of what it
does consist in are obscure (Olson 1996, pp. 389-91; Sider 2001,
pp. 161-5; Witt 2020, §10).
Alternatively, person essentialists can accept that the foetus you
grew from exists now, as an adult, but deny that it can ever have
the mental powers sufficient for personhood. It may have somemental
powers now—those it had before you came into being, perhaps—but
it can never become intelligent and self-conscious. So no nonperson
can become a person, just as person essentialism demands.
We might call this a ‘psychological’ solution, as it has to do with
mental powers. It has important advantages over the metaphysical
solution. Suppose you one day get severe dementia. The metaphysical
solution appears to imply that the foetus you grew from, having been
destroyed by the appearance of intelligence and self-consciousness, is
distinct from the dementia sufferer. The psychological solution allows
them to be the same, as they appear to be. It would also solve the
thinking-animal problem: whatever prevents an ex-foetus or potential
dementia sufferer from being intelligent and self-conscious in its
adult prime could also prevent a human organism from having those
properties. (Presumably the foetus you grew from is a human
organism.)
But the psychological solution is no less mysterious than its meta-
physical counterpart. It’s hard to see what could prevent a healthy,
mature ex-foetus or human organism from being intelligent and
self-conscious, given that it can have other mental properties (as
well as being physically and behaviourally identical to a person).
The best-known response to this question is Lynne Rudder Baker’s.
She claims that human animals can be conscious and modestly
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intelligent, but are necessarily incapable of self-consciousness—that is,
of thought requiring what she calls a ‘first-person perspective’.6 This is
because ‘the appearance of a first-person perspective makes an onto-
logical difference in the universe’—that is, a difference in what there is
(Baker 2000, p. 163; see also pp. 17, 218-20). If, per impossibile, a foetus
or organism could first lack a first-person perspective and then have
one, the advent of this perspective would not create a new thing, but
merely alter an old one, like someone’s becoming a lumberjack. It
would make no difference to what there is. Likewise, if you could
survive the loss of your first-person perspective, nothing would there-
by cease to exist. Given that having such a perspective is what it is to
be a person, you could become a nonperson. It would merely change
you. Baker takes this to imply that ‘persons as such have no onto-
logical significance’ (Baker 2000, p. 220), which she finds manifestly
absurd.
Though this may sound like an argument for Lockean person es-
sentialism in addition to those mentioned in §2, it isn’t really. The
crucial claim is that if we were people contingently, people as such
‘would have no ontological significance’. No one can hear that with-
out feeling repelled. How could you and I fail to have ontological
significance? But ‘ontological significance’ is a technical term.
Baker’s statement that Fs as such have no ontological significance in
fact means nothing more than that Fs are only contingently F. (For
lumberjacks as such to have no ontological significance is for them to
be only contingently lumberjacks.) What she presents as an unattract-
ive consequence of denying person essentialism is only a restatement
of that denial in dyslogistic terms. Its force is purely rhetorical.
The important thing, however, is not Baker’s argument for person
essentialism, but her account of why a healthy, mature human organ-
ism or former foetus could never be intelligent and self-conscious,
despite having other mental properties such as consciousness. Her
answer appears to be that this is because human organisms are not
intelligent and self-conscious essentially. They might otherwise be
ideally suited to have these properties, having just the right brain,
surroundings, education, and behaviour. They are not prevented
from being intelligent and self-conscious by their materiality, their
6 Baker concedes that an organism can be self-conscious in the derivative sense of ‘con-
stituting’ another being that is self-conscious nonderivatively, but not in the straightforward
sense that you and I are (2000, pp. 197f.).
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parts, or their persistence conditions. What prevents it is the mere fact
that they could exist without having those properties.
But although the claim that Fs are essentially F entails that things
not essentially F cannot be F at all, it does not by itself explain why
they can’t be. If intelligence and self-consciousness are essential to the
beings that have them, then human organisms and former foetuses,
which are not essentially intelligent and self-conscious, cannot be so
even contingently. But that is no explanation of their surprising men-
tal incapacity. To take a similar case, suppose an infallible source told
us that whatever has mass has it essentially. Given that photons are
not essentially massive, it follows that it is impossible for them to have
mass. But again, this would not explain why not: it would not tell us
what it is about being a quantum of light that rules out having mass.
Likewise, Baker’s essentialist claim, even if it’s true, does not tell us
what it is about being a human organism that rules out intelligence
and self-consciousness.
It may be that the fact simply has no explanation. Maybe there is no
point in asking why a merely conscious being cannot become self-
conscious, as there are no other, ‘underlying’ facts in terms of which it
could be explained. But not even Baker has ever made this unlikely
claim.
7. Alternatives
The problem, then, is that the foetus you grew from would appear to
exist now, and to have the same mental properties now that you have,
making it a person but only contingently. Person essentialists must
either deny that that being now exists—the metaphysical solution—or
deny that it now has your mental properties—the psychological
solution.
What if we don’t like either of these proposals? Suppose it’s possible
for a foetal nonperson to become a mature human adult, and in this
condition to have the mental powers sufficient for personhood. Then
something can be a person contingently and temporarily, contrary to
person essentialism in both its strong and weak forms. In particular, it
must be possible for us. And not merely possible: we actually begin as
nonpeople. If any human foetus can become a person, those that we
grew from have actually done so. And in that case these beings are
none other than you and me. (No one would say that the foetus’s
becoming intelligent and self-conscious made it a second person in
Eric T. Olson and Karsten Witt 15
Mind, Vol. 0 . 0 . 2020 ! Mind Association 2020
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
ind/fzaa016/5864510 by N
ational U
niversity of Singapore user on 29 June 2020
addition to you.) In fact, each of us must exist as soon as the foetus we
grew from has any mental properties at all, if not earlier. (Otherwise,
again, it must have either ceased to exist or survived but never become
intelligent and self-conscious.)
And it would not only be the property being a person that we must
have only accidentally, but also the property being a person at some
time. Each of us could have existed without ever being a person. If you
were once a foetus that was not yet a person, you could have died
before becoming one and thus remained a nonperson throughout
your life.
Suppose all this is right: we start out as embryos lacking the mental
powers necessary for personhood; we can survive without those
powers in a state of severe dementia; and we might have existed
without ever having them. They are only contingent and temporary
properties of us. Would anything remain of the widespread view that
we are in some way fundamentally psychological beings—that psych-
ology is woven into our deepest metaphysical nature?
It may seem not. It may seem to follow, in fact, that we are bio-
logical organisms (‘animalism’). We should persist by virtue of some
sort of brute-physical continuity. We should differ from dogs and
trees by having certain mental properties for part of our lives, but
even if this is our normal condition, it would be no more essential to
us as individuals than our having two legs. The natural alternative to
person essentialism is a combination of animalism and a brute-
physical account of our persistence. That would avoid all the prob-
lems we have discussed.
But there is another possibility. We might be fundamentally psycho-
logical beings in a weaker sense. Even if no particular mental powers
such as intelligence or self-consciousness are essential to us, having
some mental powers or other might be. Presumably this would hold
for all beings with mental powers: whatever has mental powers has
mental powers essentially, and could not exist without any. We might
call this psychological essentialism. It follows from person essentialism
but does not entail it, and comes in analogous weak and strong forms.
On this view, our persistence might still consist in some sort of
psychological continuity. We could even accept a standard
psychological-continuity view of personal identity: that we persist
by virtue of continuity of mental properties generally, not only those
required for personhood. (This would entail psychological essential-
ism: if you could not persist without psychological continuity, you
could not exist without mental powers.) This would be a view
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intermediate between the two familiar ‘extremes’: Lockean person
essentialism combined with a standard psychological-continuity
view, which we have shown to be inconsistent, and animalism com-
bined with a brute-physical account of our persistence.7
Whatever its appeal, however, this intermediate view has a number
of drawbacks. Most obviously, it implies that no biological organism,
or at least none that we know of, could have mental powers: not even
the capacity for basic consciousness. It says that whatever has mental
powers has them essentially. But all organisms we know of can exist
without the sophisticated nervous system required for mental powers,
and actually do in their embryonic state. To explain what prevents
organisms from having such powers, we should have to return to the
proposals of §4, to do with their materiality, their parts, or their
persistence conditions.
It also implies that acquiring the properties that make something a
person creates no new entity, and losing them destroys none: people
as such ‘have no ontological significance’.
Further, it rules out any account of personal identity as such—that
is, any persistence conditions that necessarily apply to all and only
people in the Lockean sense. Any account of personal identity com-
patible with the intermediate view will apply to foetuses and dementia
sufferers that are not people. That’s because the intermediate view says
that such an account is true of us, and that we were once such foetuses
and could become severely demented. In fact, we should expect it to
apply to all beings with mental powers, dogs included.8 Some deny
that such a view is ‘even a contender as an account of personal identity
over time’ (Baker 2000, p. 124, emphasis in original); see also Gert
1971, pp. 475f.; and Johnston 2010, p. 256) and find this unacceptable.
And it is incompatible with Parfit’s influential account of personal
identity briefly mentioned in §3: that a person persists for a day only if
she exhibits a certain number of direct psychological connections.9
When a human foetus acquires its first mental powers there are very
7 Unger (2000) and McMahan (2002, pp. 66-9) have made proposals of this sort, though
not for the reasons we discuss here.
8 Or more precisely, beings that stand to canine organisms as we stand to human
organisms.
9 1984, p. 206. Parfit says only that such direct psychological connections are required for
someone to be the same person as you. But as we argued in §2, he does not take this to be
required for you to persist only while you are a person, or to allow you to survive without it as
a nonperson.
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few such connections—certainly fewer than Parfit’s account requires.
His account rules out the intermediate view’s claim that we were once
such foetuses.
Though the intermediate view may be worth exploring, we doubt
whether it will find many friends. What are the alternatives? One is to
stick with person essentialism and try to solve the problems we have
identified. That will require a novel account of our persistence com-
patible with person essentialism along the lines sketched in §3. And it
means developing either the ‘metaphysical’ or the ‘psychological’ so-
lution of §6. The first requires an explanation of why no human foetus
can survive normal development into a healthy child even though it is
physically and psychologically continuous with one. The second
requires an account of why a foetus that survived this could never
become intelligent and self-conscious, despite having had mental
properties previously. Any of these will be a large and daunting re-
search project.
The other alternative is to give up person essentialism and accept a
view that avoids the problems, the most natural being that we are
biological organisms. There is no easier way out.10
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